

LUSITANIANS AGAINST ROMANS INVADERS

The Romans in Iberian Península

The Lusitanian War

"Outline the vicissitudes of Rome's Lusitanian War. Discuss Rome's motives for involvement in Lusitania."

To begin with, we must summarise the major events of the Lusitanian War, which lasted from 218 - 133 BC. The fall of Numantia is generally seen as the end of the Lusitanian War, due to the fact that, after this point, real Lusitanian resistance ended. Prior to 218 BC, Carthaginian armies under Hamilcar Barca and Hasdrubal Barca had conquered large areas of Iberian Península. They had great problems against the Lusitanians, who were good fighters. Hamilcar was defeated and killed in battle in 229 BC, and Hasdrubal replaced him. Although he was more successful, he threatened Saguntum. Appian says Saguntum was a free Greek city, and other authors say it was a full ally of Rome. Saguntum sent to Rome for help. The Romans made a treaty with the Carthaginians whereby the Carthaginians were not allowed to cross the Ebro river, which divided Iberian from the Pyrenees. They also forbade Carthage to attack Saguntum. Hasdrubal was assassinated by a disgruntled slave, and was replaced by his son Hannibal. Hannibal broke the treaty made earlier by attacking the city of Saguntum, in 218 BC. Although Roman ambassadors made attempts to dissuade Hannibal, they did nothing concrete until Saguntum fell. Then they went to Carthage, and declared war. This was the start of the Second Punic War.

During the Second Punic War, Roman armies were sent to península under commanders who were replaced often. First, Publius and Gnaeus Scipio were sent. They scored some success, especially when Hasdrubal (not to be confused with Hasdrubal, father of Hannibal), the Carthaginian general in iberia, was recalled briefly to fight the Numidians. When he returned, however, with some elephants, Hasdrubal defeated and killed the Scipios in 212 BC.

The second Roman detachment was commanded by Marcellus and Nero, two commanders of little skill. Despite reinforcements, they were defeated by the Carthaginians. The Romans feared a Carthaginian incursion into Italy, as Hannibal was in Southern Italy and a reinforcement for him would be disastrous for the Romans.

The third Roman commander in península was Publius Scipio on Cornelius. It was he who would eventually defeat Hannibal at Zama and hence gain the epithet "Africanus". He was, at this time (211 BC) so young that the Romans hesitated to send him out, but he persuaded them to do so. With only 10 000 men and 500 cavalry, he sailed to península. He saw that península had tired of their Carthaginian masters, and began to style himself as a divine agent. He saw that the Carthaginian armies were separated, under Hasdrubal, Mago and Hasdrubal Gisco. He saw that the vital port of New Carthage was garrisoned, under Mago, with even fewer troops than he had, and was far from reinforcements. Taking advantage of a lagoon near the city that emptied with low tide, he took New Carthage by a ruse. Scipio became a hero.

Scipio then attacked and defeated Hasdrubal Gisco at a great battle near Carmone, despite being outnumbered three to one, in 207 BC. He then stayed at New Carthage.

Scipio then went to Africa for negotiations. Meanwhile a general named Marcius surrounded some iberians under Hanno the Carthaginian, who asked for terms. He so infuriated them with his reply that they fought on, and he killed many. The rest joined Mago the Carthaginian. This was the first time the Romans fought the iberian directly.

Silanus, Scipio's deputy, was then sent to Castax to make sure they accepted Roman rule. When they refused, Scipio attacked both this city and the city of Ilurgia, where a similar rebellion took place. He slaughtered everyone in Ilurgia. Then Castax surrendered quickly. Scipio returned to New Carthage.

Marcius then besieged the pro-Carthaginian town of Astapa. They committed mass-suicide after a suicide attack by their soldiers failed.

Scipio fell ill, and command devolved to Marcius. Some Romans were rebellious because Scipio had got all the adulation for their fighting. Some ran off and joined Mago. Scipio sent word to them to return. When they did, he executed many of them, and thus the mutiny was put to an end.

A iberian rebel, the first of the iberian war, began an advance into Roman territory. He was called Indibilis. Scipio defeated Indibilis in a battle, and fined him as a penalty. From 205 BC, Rome began sending Praetors to península, governors or superintendents to keep the peace. Thus iberia became a province of

Rome.

Indibilis rebelled again when Scipio left península in 205 BC. The Roman commanders defeated and killed him. The First península War thus ended.

The Second iberian War began in 197 BC, with more rebellions. The Romans sent out commanders again: first Tuditanus and Helvius, then Minucius, and finally Cato.

Cato won a great battle against the rebels at Emporiae. He then got all the iberian rebels along the Ebro to demolish their walls at the same time, by a trick. Then peace was restored to península.

Yet another revolt took place in 181 BC. This Lusonian Revolt. Flaccus, a consul was sent to Lusitania. He defeated the rebels, and invested the city of Complega, where many rebels took shelter. He was replaced before he could capture the city.

Gracchus replaced Flaccus. In 179 BC, the Roman allied city of Caravis was besieged by Celtiberian rebels. Gracchus forced the Celtiberians to retire, and liberated the city. Complega, the rebel city, then sent a false delegation of 20 000 out to meet Gracchus. They attacked Gracchus, who tricked them too, by making a false retreat. They were defeated, and Complega fell into Gracchus' hands.

In 153 BC, rebellion broke out again. The city of Segeda rebelled, and many iberian cities joined them. They began building a wall around their city. Nobilior was sent against them, with 30 000 men. He was ambushed by a skilful Segedan general, Carus, and 6000 Romans were slain. However, Carus was slain in a counterattack.

The Arevaci, a iberian tribe, then revolted. They hid out at Numantia, a particularly strong iberian town. Nobilior attacked the city, using a force of elephants. This failed when they stampeded. He then sent for iberian reinforcements, but these were ambushed and fled. Another iberian town, Ocilis, then rebelled.

Nobilior was replaced by one Claudius Marcellus, who was also ambushed by Celtiberians though he managed to fight them off. He then besieged Ocilis, came to terms, and fined the city.

The Nergobriges, a rebel tribe, came to terms, but then ambushed the Roman baggage train. Marcellus besieged the Nergobriges, and many tribes surrendered to him. Marcellus sought glory by ending the iberian wars quickly. He sent the tribes' ambassadors to Rome, telling them to carry on their negotiations there. He urged the Senate to make peace quickly. The Senate, not amused at the rebellions, refused an easy peace. They replaced Marcellus with Lucullus.

Whilst Lucullus was on his way, Marcellus quickly made peace. All the rebels surrendered and the war ended before Lucullus arrived.

Lucullus was greedy, and desired war. He despised Marcellus' peace, and invaded the Vaccaei, a Celtiberian tribe, despite the fact that they were at peace. He besieged the city of Cauca. The Caucai led a force out, and fought a big battle. They lost, however, and retreated into their city.

When they asked for terms, Lucullus made an agreement, but treacherously slaughtered great numbers of them when he entered the city. Many fled, and hid in the hills and towns nearby. The massacre was seen as shameful by the Romans

Lucullus went on to Intercatia, and besieged this town too. After his soldiers' morale went down, and supplies went low, Lucullus and Scipio his deputy made peace. Lucullus then made another unsuccessful siege, at Pallantia. He was dissuaded by constant guerilla raids.

Lucullus was not punished for his disobedience or cruelty.

In 155 BC, the Lusitanians revolted, under Punicus. He captured a lot of Roman península, but was killed in a siege and replaced by Caesarus. Caesarus attacked the Roman Mummius. He feigned retreat and killed 9000 Romans. Mummius then defeated the rebels at Ocilis, and was awarded a triumph.

He was replaced by Atilius, who invaded Lusitania and captured Oxthrakai. They surrendered, but revolted again in winter.

Atilius was replaced by Galba. Galba defeated the rebels in battle, but again was deceived by a false retreat. 7000 Romans were killed, and Galba retreated to Carmone.

Lucullus was wintering at Turdentania. Both he and Galba invaded Lusitania, and the Lusitanians surrendered.

Galba offered to give the Lusitanians a new home; but when they assembled for surrender he massacred them. A few escaped, among them Viriathus. Galba then kept most of the plunder himself, and avoided prosecution by bribery.

In 148 BC, the survivors of Galba massacre revolted again, and captured the territory of Turdetania. They chose Viriathus as

leader. Viriathus was born in Loriga, modern Loriga, in Portugal. Many tribes sent him rebel fighters, who used guerilla tactics. Thus began the revolt of Viriathus, which lasted eight years and cost the Romans many casualties. Viriathus ambushed and killed Vetilius. He then overran Carpetania. He defeated the replacement for Vetilius, Plautius, in two battles. He was driven off by Plautius' successor Maximus, though not without a great number of ambushes against the Roman.

Viriathus decided that he had underestimated the Romans, and in 143 BC, he told the tribes of the Arevaci, Titthi and Belli to revolt separately. This was the Numantine War. Aulus was too poor a general to defeat Viriathus, though he sent out an Iberian subordinate, Gaius Marcius, against him.

Aulus was succeeded in 142 BC by Servilianus, bringing elephant allies from Numidia. In a big battle, he too was tricked by a false retreat, and 3000 Romans were killed. He was forced back to Itucca.

Viriathus finally retreated when he was short of supplies, and went back to Lusitania. Many rebels were captured by Servilianus when he followed up Viriathus' withdrawal. However, Viriathus attacked the Romans near Erisana, and chased them until they were trapped against cliffs. He made peace, and the Romans declared that Viriathus could keep the land he had captured. This occurred in 140 BC.

Servilianus was replaced by Caepio. Caepio pleaded with the Senate to be allowed to attack Viriathus because he felt the treaty was humiliating. Finally they agreed. Caepio attacked Viriathus, who escaped successfully.

Many Lusitanian tribes then rose up in rebellion. S. Junius Brutus was sent against them. He decided not to face the rebels directly, as their guerilla tactics would make this too difficult. He decided to capture their home towns. Many Iberian towns were captured by Brutus, and he subdued the rebels, and returned to Rome.

Caepio bribed Viriathus' best friends to kill him. They did so, and Viriathus was cremated. He was replaced by Tantalus, who was immediately defeated by Caepio. Thus ended the revolt of Viriathus, which had lasted eight years.

Meanwhile the Numantine war had been progressing simultaneously. In 143 BC, Caecilius Metellus was sent to the Numantines, to subdue them. In 141 BC, his successor Pompeius attacked the nearby Termantians. He fought a major, though indecisive, battle. He returned to Numantia, but the siege was progressing very poorly, largely due to ambushes. Like Marcellus many years before, he tried desperately to make peace before his successor arrived. The Numantines agreed to his soft terms, but the Senate refused to acknowledge it. They replaced Pompeius with Popilius.

Popilius was soon replaced by Mancinus. Mancinus was suddenly surrounded by Numantines, and made a humiliating peace. A furious Senate sent out Aemilius to replace Mancinus. Aemilius, like Lucullus before him, decided to attack the Vaccae in search of loot. The Senate told him to stop, but he ignored them, besieging the city of Pallantia. Supplies ran out, and they made a humiliating retreat, ambushed on the way. Unlike Lucullus, Aemilius was punished for his illegal invasion of the Vaccae, and was fined. He was replaced by Scipio Aemilianus, who besieged Numantia. In 133 BC, Numantia, starving and driven to cannibalism, finally surrendered to Scipio Aemilianus. Scipio razed the city to the ground, and thus gained the epithet Numantinus. He divided the territory of the Numantines amongst their neighbours, and sailed for home. Thus ends our brief summary of the vicissitudes of the Lusitanian war.

We must now assess Rome's motives for involvement in Lusitania. It may be seen from the outline above that Rome faced severe problems in Lusitania. The awkward nature of the terrain, the guerilla-methods of the Lusitanians and the low morale of Roman troops in Lusitania all conspired to make the Lusitanian campaign the most drawn-out and difficult campaign of this period. Yet the Romans persisted in attempting to subdue this area. In the second section of this essay, Rome's possible motives for involvement in Lusitania will be discussed. First it will be necessary to analyse why Rome first got involved in Lusitania. Was this an act of aggression or of defensiveness on the part of the Romans? Why are the sources so contradictory when discussing precisely how the Second Punic War began? Can we deduce any possible propaganda or concealment of the truth in relation to these inconsistencies, or are they simple errors by our sources? These questions must be answered in order to deduce the initial motives of the Romans when they first crossed the Lusitanian border. Then we must tackle a more difficult question. Why did the Romans continue to subdue Lusitania after the Carthaginians were defeated at Zama? If this was mere imperialism, designed to benefit from Lusitanian's massive silver reserves and other resources, why do we have evidence of the Romans' avoiding imperialism in 197 BC (with the Greek

Settlement of Flaminius)? Are we to explain this inconsistency by observing differences between Greece and Lusitania? Was it rather due to pride on the part of the Roman leaders a feeling of entitlement as they had had towards other ex-Carthaginian provinces?

As we have seen above, Rome's Lusitanian War was a shameful episode in her history - an extremely protracted and bloody series of wars, which lowered Roman soldiers morale and resulted in terrible atrocities. Why did the Romans get into Lusitania in the first place? Why Viriathus was killed, murdered?

We shall firstly examine the three major accounts of the fateful events in 218 BC that would lead to the 2nd Punic War. These are the detailed accounts of the historians Polybios, Livy, and Appian. First we shall quickly look at each account in turn. Then we must consider why the accounts differ in many respects, despite their agreement on general points. Lastly we shall see what the initial Roman motives were in Lusitania on the basis of this evidence.

The oldest testimony under consideration here is that of Polybios. Polybios, in his historical writing, is ostentatiously careful about his evidence, telling his readers, "Some uncritical readers might think that it is unnecessary for me to discuss considerations of this kind in such detail...but I shall insist that a knowledge of past events such as I have described is not merely an asset, but is absolutely essential..." He claims not to be interested in writing popularist work, but claims that he is tenciously sticking to the truth by exhausting analysis. He is even prepared to correct the words of Fabius Pictor, first Roman historian. Consequently, his account of the Carthaginian attack on Saguntum is by far the longest and most detailed of the three, and probably the most reliable.

Polybios claims that Saguntum was a full ally of Rome, but does not deny that it was south of the Ebro. Unlike the other historians, he does not have Hannibal using deception to capture Saguntum. He has Saguntum sending panicked envoys to Rome before Hannibal even began to attack. Rome then delays before starting to warn Hannibal. He has Hannibal replying to Roman attempts to dissuade him, by saying that he was helping the Saguntines, who had asked Rome to arbitrate in their quarrels, and got harshly treated. He gives three reasons for Hannibal iege of Saguntum would stop the Romans from attacking him in celtiberia, it would be an effective terror weapon against other conquered tribes, and lastly it would allow him to pass relatively easily into Northern Italy - an important point.

Rome declare war after Saguntum falls. They claim Hannibal broke a much earlier treaty, stating that neither Rome nor Carthage could attack the allies of the other. Strangely, Polybios has them also claiming that Hannibal broke the latest treaty by crossing the Ebro, which is quite untrue. He is possibly telescoping this treaty violation with Hannibal's later violation of the Ebro treaty. He then has Romans going to Carthage, and gives the same account of the declaration of war as Livy and Appian.

Livy's account is only slightly different. We must not forget that he had Polybios as a source. He has Hannibal immediately deciding to attack Saguntum, a Roman ally. Hannibal cunningly attacks a nearby tribe, to make it seem that his projected attack on Saguntum is merely part of a wider conquest of other tribes, and hence gain sympathy from Rome. Before the Romans could officially complain, Hannibal began his siege. An extremely lengthy account of the siege follows.

Livy disagrees with Polybios' date for the fall of Saguntum, on chronological grounds. He records the shame in Rome at their failure to help their ally quickly enough, and their great fear of Carthage. The armies under Cornelius and Sempronius were sent out, to both iberian peninsula and Africa.

Appian has a largely different account. Oddly, he claims (incorrectly) that Saguntum is north of the Ebro rather than south of it. Hannibal's move north was therefore a breach of the Ebro Treaty, which said that the Carthaginians could not cross the Ebro in arms. He states unequivocally that Saguntum was never an ally of Rome, but says that in the Ebro treaty, Saguntum and other free Greek cities were to remain free (unlike the version of Polybios which doesn't mention this clause). In order to avoid condemnation, Hannibal pays the Turbetes to claim publicly that they were being attacked by Saguntum, and that the Saguntines are being paid to do this by Rome. Unlike Livy, his description of the siege ends in a glorious suicide-attack by the beleagured celtiberians, who are all wiped out. However, as in Livy, Rome waits until Saguntum falls before declaring war.

An important further source is a fragment of Cassius Dio, an historian from the Imperial period. This fragment, concerns an earlier Roman embassy to Hamilcar Barca in about 231 BC. Here, Hamilcar is approached by Roman ambassadors and is asked about his expansion in Iberian Peninsula. Cassius Dio records that Rome had no imperial interest in peninsula at this time. Hamilcar assures the envoys that he needs to conquer iberian peoples in order to pay off Carthaginian debts to

Rome (after the First Punic War). The envoys, confused, leave. This fragment is valuable, as it gives us some idea of Roman attitudes to Lusitania at this time.

The three accounts of Appian, Polybios and Livy, differ in several respects. We must now analyse why this should be so. Firstly, the confused accounts of the terms of the Ebro treaty and the state of Saguntum's relations with Rome are highly suggestive. One would be inclined to believe Polybios' meticulous record of every treaty between Rome and Carthage. The Ebro Treaty is quoted as " Carthaginians shall not cross the Ebro in arms" There is no mention here of special cases. Polybios claims Saguntum was, for some reason, an ally of Rome, and therefore covered by an earlier treaty forbidding the Carthaginians to attack allies of Rome. However, he gives no reason for Rome's delay in declaring war, merely saying that "When the news of Saguntum's fall was received in Rome, there was no debate on whether or not to go to war.") Unlike Livy, he does not mention the Senate's guilt or regret at not helping their ally. Perhaps this is a sign that the alliance was a later fiction, designed to justify Rome's declaration of war despite the fact that the Ebro treaty was not yet violated?

We must turn now to Appian. Appian, as stated above, says Saguntum was no ally of Rome. Indeed, he says that this was the main reason for Rome's lack of action over Hannibal's siege of Saguntum. While Appian's version of the Ebro treaty justifies Roman intervention in this matter, it is clear that Saguntum was a free city. This could make Polybios' account of an alliance between Saguntum and Rome suspect. Polybios had not mentioned why the Romans took so long to act. Perhaps there was no alliance, and the army was sent out only because Italy was endangered by Hannibal's actions? Furthermore, Appian notoriously introduces a second strange factor to the equation, namely his mistake in saying that Saguntum was north of the Ebro, and Hannibal's siege was not in violation of an alliance, but that of the Ebro treaty. He further states that Saguntum was renamed "New Carthage". This is an even more suspicious error, as New Carthage had been founded some ten years earlier, and some miles down the coast. Not only was it south of ancient Saguntum (modern Sagunto), but it was almost the furthest south from the Ebro that the Carthaginians could go. Indeed, it was Hannibal's headquarters for this campaign, according to Livy. Of course, we could say that Appian was merely ignorant of geography, which is the easiest answer. After all, Lusitania was far from Italy, and perhaps Appian was not too worried about geographical exactitude. However, Polybios' remarks about which treaties the Carthaginians had violated curiously matches that of Appian, which claims (wrongly) that in attacking Saguntum, Hannibal violated the Ebro Treaty. We have suggested above that this was due to Polybios' mentioning at once both this incident, and his crossing of the Ebro after the Romans declared war. However, there is another possibility.

The confusion over which treaty was violated, present in both Polybios and Appian, strongly suggests that there was no treaty violation. This would explain Rome's failure to act quickly, the confusion over which treaty was violated, Appian's alternative evidence and the Carthaginian refusal to order Hannibal's withdrawal. Perhaps the idea that some treaty was violated is merely a fiction, designed to justify the declaration of war which was made without legal reason.

In that case, we must now consider Rome's true motive for opposing Carthage's Iberian expansion. First, we must look at the fragment, cited above, of Cassius Dio. Importantly, he states that, at the time of the Carthaginian expansion, Rome had no interest in Lusitania as a potential province. We must be careful, of course, because this statement conveniently exonerates Rome from responsibility for starting the war, and makes it seem that it was purely the threat of Carthage that caused Rome to enter the peninsula in the way she did, not a desire to wrest the wealth of Iberian peninsula from Carthage's grasp. But we must remember that no other author seems to care much about justifying Roman occupation of peninsula. (We shall go into this further. See below for references to Roman attitudes to Lusitanian occupation). The authors seem to take it for granted that their readers feel no "guilt" at the Lusitanian occupation, nor do they seem to feel a need to justify this action. If Cassius Dio had wished to justify anything, he would not therefore have chosen his particular argument. Cassius Dio's statement may be taken as a fact. Rome probably did not project an imperial conquest of Lusitania at the time of Carthage's expansion.

If we require any more proof, we could look at Rome's failure to enter peninsula earlier. Rome only decided to enter peninsula when Hannibal had entered the (relatively) poor regions of northeastern peninsula. Peninsula's resources of silver, gold and olive oil were mainly concentrated in the west of the peninsula, not in the northeast where Saguntum was. As stated previously, Rome virtually gave Carthage free rein over all areas south of the Ebro. This has been suggested that this was because the Ebro formed a natural line between the Pyrenees and peninsula proper. It was therefore a treaty designed to protect Rome, not to allow Rome to take over eastern peninsula. The treaty was unprofitable, but kept Italy safe.

Rome's motives for entering península were therefore those fears described in Livy. Carthage was a different matter [from Sardinia, Corsica, Istria or Illyria]. She had long been an enemy to Rome, and her troops, trained in twenty-three years of hard and consistently successful warfare in iberian península "e bringing with them innumerable Lusitanians already battle-hungry, and would soon be raising the Gauls, with their insatiable appetite for blood. War was coming, and it would be fought in Italy, in defence of the walls of Rome, and against the world in arms." Some of this is undoubtedly later feeling based on Rome's terrifying experience at the hands of Hannibal, but pointing to a basic truth. The reason why Rome crossed into península in the beginning, the reason why she possibly falsified reports that Hannibal had broken a treaty, and the initial reason for the sending out of troops, was that Rome feared Hannibal, and wished to act quickly, before Hannibal could cross the Ebro.

Now we must decide why Rome stayed in iberian península even after the Carthaginians had left. The reason why this is so puzzling is that, in the Greek Settlement of Flamininus, in 196 BC, the Romans voluntarily declared all the Greeks in Europe and Asia "Free without garrison, without tribute, and in full enjoyment of their ancestral laws". This not only made them as free as they were before, but also made some Greek states, that were under Philip V rule, as free as the others, thus in a sense "liberating" those Greek states under Macedonian rule. This was taken by the ancient writers as proof that Rome was not interested in empire at this time For instance, Livy, recording the settlement of Greece, goes on by writing a small panegyric about how Rome fought "for the freedom of other men...to conceive of such a hope had needed a bold spirit; to bring it to realisation was a proof of boundless courage and good fortune without limit."

How can this be reconciled with the long and brutal campaign being fought simultaneously against tribes who had called Rome for assistance twenty-two years earlier? Carthage had left península in 205 BC; why did the Romans not leave as they had Greece? No ancient author seems to address this issue directly, or even to have been aware that there was any issue to address. We must therefore indulge in some speculation, based upon the few pieces of evidence we have on this point.

To begin with, a look at the sources is necessary. Polybios, the oldest authority, is missing the particular section dealing with the point at which Carthage left península. Appian merely states "At this time, which was a little before the 144th Olympiad, the Romans began to send praetors to Lusitania yearly to the conquered peoples". There is no mention of a deliberate policy on the part of Rome to continue its occupation of Lusitania.

Livy, too, fails to give us any account of a deliberate policy. He seems simply to take it for granted that Roman occupation was necessary. In a telling passage, he describes how the iberian Ilergetes tribe felt about the Roman occupation just after the Carthaginians left: "Back then, iberian had been the slave either of Carthage or Rome, not necessarily alternately, but sometimes both at once." This statement, and the associated passage in Livy (see reference) naturally show only what Livy thought the Spaniards should think about the Roman occupation; but it is, as stated earlier, a telling remark. It shows that Livy expected the Romans at this date to occupy Lusitania as conquerors, as equals of Hamilcar, Hasdrubal and Hannibal; just as, slightly later in his Histories, he thought it natural that Rome should altruistically give up Greece.

What reason can there be for this discrepancy? We must see how the Greek situation differed from that of the lusitanian situation, in order to come up with a motive for Rome's imperialism in Lusitania.

There is the obvious question of material gain. Lusitania was, and remained for many years, one of Rome's richest provinces. Her silver mines, particularly, were a major source of Roman silver. Rome's decision to stay in Lusitania will have been heavily influenced by the desire for wealth. Nonetheless, this cannot be the complete answer, as Macedonia and Greece were also extremely rich, from the spoils of Persia, for instance. Rome's decision to occupy Lusitania cannot therefore have been based purely on material concerns.

Another possible motive was the fact that Rome was short of troops after the Second Punic War. After the three disastrous battles in Italy, there was a severe shortfall of personnel. Indeed, Rome even had to raise three legions made up of hastily freed slaves. Rome may not have wanted to garrison Greece, or to have to put down any possible revolts by Greeks who resented them. Naturally the same thing would have to apply to Lusitania, which was absorbing an extremely large amount of Roman manpower, because of its constant wars and guerilla actions. However, it may well be that Rome decided not to bother about occupying Greece because of the problems with Lusitania. Lusitania, being a western province recently vacated by Carthage, may have seemed, in Roman eyes, to be worth occupying, while Greece was cleanly defeated at Kynoskephalai, thus removing any urgent need for garrisoning.

Added to this is the fact that Rome couldn't be sure that Carthage would not rise again and reoccupy Lusitania, especially after Rome's near-defeat in Italy. Even after Carthage had been defeated at the

battle of Zama, Rome may have decided to play it safe by continuing her occupation of Iberian peninsula. This seems like a possible scenario, although there is no direct evidence for it.

We can, however, consider the fact that Rome retained three vital strongpoints in Greece, even after the Greek Settlement. These were the so-called "fettters of Greece". Livy records that Rome garrisoned these three cities "until the anxiety about Antiochos should die down". Antiochos, king of the Seleukids, was, according to Livy, certain to cross to Europe and capture Greece as soon as Rome left. However, it is clear that Rome also wished to hold these three cities for another reason. The reason why they were called "fettters of Greece" was that holding them had allowed Philip V to retain military control over the whole of Greece without actually capturing the whole area. Rome thus wanted to keep Greece under control with relatively few soldiers, showing perhaps that Rome did indeed wish to keep her thumb on Greece without using up too much personnel.

Another factor that kept Rome in Lusitania may have been a feeling of entitlement. Firstly, the fact that Lusitania had been a Carthaginian province may have caused the Romans to feel a sense of entitlement to it. The evidence for this lies in their earlier acquisition of the provinces of Sicily and Sardinia. These had both been part of the Carthaginian empire, but after the First Punic War, Rome had remained in occupation of Sicily and later annexed Sardinia. We can speculate from this incident that Rome felt she had an entitlement to Carthaginian provinces. She occupied Sicily and Sardinia, apparently without qualm. We do not know why this should be so, but it does not matter for this discussion. Roman motives for the conquest of peninsula may therefore have involved a feeling of entitlement towards Iberian peninsula as an ex-Carthaginian territory.

Another reason why Rome may have felt it led remain in Lusitania, was that there was a history of colonies in Lusitania. "civilised" peoples had colonised Lusitania for some centuries before the Punic War. Rome may well have felt that such nations were suitable for conquest where Greece was not. Iberian Peninsula, a polyglot of several different cultures, may also have struck Rome as being incapable of ruling itself, and hence taking over was not "true" imperialism. The evidence for this attitude is pointed out by Bane. Bane says that several of the historical traditions, such as those of Florus, Velleius Paterculus and Orosius, claim that the Iberian tribes were a barbaric people, whose "brigandage" forced Rome to stay and help the Celtiberian to rise above their barbarian" squalour. Such an attitude may have been present during Rome's early occupation of Lusitania, and have led to them justifying their occupation by this alleged duty.

Rome motives for continuing her occupation of Lusitania cannot therefore be explained as mere desire for territory and resources though this would certainly have been a major consideration. We have seen several explanations for why Rome may have felt an entitlement towards Celtiberia that she did not have towards Greece. We have seen how the implications of occupying Greece differed from those of occupying Lusitania; because of Lusitania? Occupation by Carthage, because of Lusitania? History of colonisation, and because of Lusitania? Tribal society, Rome may have seen an occupation of Lusitania in a different light from a similar occupation of Greece.